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RANGKAKERJA PENGESANAN SERANGAN DDoS PERMINTAAN GEMA 
ICMPv6 MENGGUNAKAN RANGKAIAN NEURAL RAMBATAN BALIK 
 
ABSTRAK 
Pertumbuhan pesat Internet dalam beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini telah 
mendedahkan had ruang alamat dalam protokol Internet semasa (IP), iaitu, IPv4. 
Permintaan yang semakin meningkat dalam penggunaan alamat IP telah 
mengakibatkan kehabisan alamat IPv4 seperti yang dijangkakan. Untuk menangani 
kebimbangan ini, IPv6 baru telah dibangunkan untuk menyediakan ruang alamat 
yang mencukupi. IPv6 dimuatkan dengan protokol baru, iaitu, versi Protokol Mesej 
Kawalan Internet 6 (ICMPv6), dan protokol baru ini membuka pintu bagi penyerang 
untuk menyerang rangkaian IPv6. Salah satu jenis serangan yang paling kerap dalam 
rangkaian IPv6 pada lapisan rangkaian adalah satu serangan banjir ICMPv6 DoS / 
DDoS. Laporan Arbor Network pada tahun 2014 menunjukkan bahawa ancaman 
terhadap IPv6 semakin meningkat (72% merupakan kebanjiran trafik/serangan 
DDoS). Di samping itu, ICMPv6 adalah protokol wajib dalam rangkaian IPv6 tidak 
seperti dalam IPv4, iaitu ICMP boleh disekat atau diturunkan melalui get laluan lalai. 
Sistem pengesanan yang sedia ada terhadap gangguan trafik memainkan peranan 
penting dalam keselamatan rangkaian komputer. Banyak kajian telah menekankan 
bahawa terdapat beberapa masalah utama yang mencabar sistem pengesanan 
gangguan trafik sedia ada. Satu lagi masalah ialah ketepatan dalam mengesan 
serangan banjir ICMPv6 DoS / DDoS, yang terjejas oleh kadar penggera palsu yang 
tinggi. Oleh yang demikian, pengesanan perkhidmatan infrastruktur, seperti pelayan 
web, terhadap serangan seperti itu merupakan isu kritikal yang perlu ditangani 
segera. Objektif tesis ini adalah untuk mencadangkan satu rangka kerja untuk 
xviii 
 
mengesan serangan banjir ICMPv6 DoS / DDoS dalam rangkaian IPv6 dengan 
menggunakan Sistem Pengesanan Pencerobohan Pintar dalam Rangkaian IPv6 
(v6IDS) melalui kaedah berasaskan ciri-ciri tingkah laku. Rangka kerja yang 
dicadangkan terdiri daripada empat peringkat untuk mencapai objektif kajian. 
Peringkat tersebut adalah seperti berikut. (1) Pengumpulan data dan peringkat 
prapemprosesan bertujuan menguasai rangkaian trafik, mengesan jenis versi IPv6, 
dan menapis paket ICMPv6 itu. (2) Peringkat analisis data bertujuan menentukan 
kedudukan dan mengekstrak ciri-ciri terbaik yang menyumbang terhadappengesanan 
serangan DoS/DDoS. (3) Peringkat pengesanan berasaskan anomali bertujuan 
mengumpulkan paket IP dan mengesan paket anomali melalui kaedah berasaskan 
peraturan ambang. (4) Peringkat pengesanan banjir ICMPv6 bertujuan mengesahkan 
pengesanan tingkah laku serangan banjir ICMPv6 menggunakan teknik rangkaian 
neural buatan. Hasil kajian menunjukkan keberkesanan rangka kerja v6IDS dalam 
mengesan serangan banjir ICMPv6 DoS / DDoS dengan menilai rangka kerja ini 
dengan menggunakan  set data trafik sebenar, yang telah dihasilkan menggunakan 
ICMPv6 berasaskan DoS / DDoS sebenar menggunakanberpusat di membanjiri katil 
ujian serangan di NAv6. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa rangka kerja v6IDS adalah 
cukup tepat dalam mengesan serangan banjir ICMPv6 DoS / DDoS, dengan 
ketepatan sebanyak 88.8% dari segi pengesanan anomali DoS/DDoS dan 98.3% dari 
segi pengesanan tingkah laku serangan banjir ICMPv6. Ketepatan rangka kerja yang 
dicadangkan itu dibandingkan dengan pendekatan lain yang terdapat dalam kajian 
literatur. Keputusannya, serta penilaian kuantitatif, jelas menunjukkan bahawa 
rangka kerja v6IDS yang dicadangkan dapat mengesan serangan banjir ICMPv6 
DoS/DDoS. 
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ICMPv6 ECHO REQUEST DDoS ATTACK DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
USING BACK-PROPAGATION NEURAL NETWORK 
 
ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth of the Internet in the last few years have exposed the 
limitation of address space in the current Internet protocol (IP) namely IPv4, due to 
the increasing consumption of IP addresses. The IPv6 has been developed to provide 
sufficient address space. It ships with a new protocol. i.e., the Internet Control 
Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6), this protocol is a mandatory protocol in IPv6 
networks unlike in IPv4, in which ICMP can be blocked or dropped. ICMPv6 opens 
the door for attackers to attack IPv6 networks. The most frequent types of attack in 
IPv6 networks at the network layer is an ICMPv6 DDoS flooding attack. One of the 
main problem in ICMPv6 DDoS flooding attacks is accuracy detection, which 
suffers from a high false alarm rate. Thus, protecting infrastructure service is a 
critical issue that urgently needs to be addressed. The aim of this thesis is to propose 
a framework for detecting ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks, which consists of 
four stages to achieve the research objectives, which are: (1) Data collection and 
preprocessing  that aims to filter out the ICMPv6 packets and filtering dataset from 
any redundant data to reduce traffic volume, thus increasing the accuracy detection 
rate. (2) Network traffic analysis that contributes on selecting the most important 
features for detecting ICMPv6 DDoS flooding attack. (3) Anomaly-based detection 
that intends to aggregate IP packets and detect anomaly packets by proposing rules-
based method with threshold technique. (4) Verification of ICMPv6 flooding 
detection that aims to verify the detection of ICMPv6 flooding attack behaviour by 
using artificial neural network technique. Since, this thesis consider the necessity for 
xx 
 
detecting anomaly-based attack that can detect the malicious traffic and improve the 
Internet security. The major contribution of this thesis is to provide a framework that 
responds to detect ICMPv6 echo request flooding attack. The result as well as its 
quantitative evaluation, clearly shows that the proposed v6IDSF can detect ICMPv6 
DDoS flooding attacks, with accuracies of 88.9% in terms of DDoS anomaly 
detection and 98.3%  in terms of ICMPv6 flooding attacks detection respectively. 
The accuracy of the proposed framework is compared with the most sufficient 
approach available in literatures using real traffic dataset. All this would help to 
improve the Internet security. 
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As with any new technology, the initial phases of IPv6 implementation are 
bound to be exploited by cybercriminals. From a security point of view, the IPv6 
protocol represents a considerable advances in relation to the IPv4 protocol. Some 
examples of security threats in IPv6 networks, such as network reconnaissance, 
routing headers, fragment headers, denial of service, efficient bottlenecks, misuse of 
ICMPv6 and multicast, ICMPv6 spoofs, risks of tunnels, and potential holes in dual 
stacks attacks (El-Bakry and Mastorakis, 2008, Zeng, 2010) (see Chapter 2 for more 
details).  
IPv6 and IPv4 are extremely similar only in terms of functionality (but not in 
terms of mechanisms). There are two auto-configuration mechanisms in IPv6; 
stateless using Stateless Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC), based on ICMPv6 
messages (Router Solicitation and Router Advertisement) and satatefull using 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6). Table 1.1 shows a 
comparison between IPv6 and IPv4. 
Table 1.1: Comparisons between IPv6 and IPv4 
 IPv4 IPv6 
Addressing 32 bits 128 bits 
Address Resolution ARP ICMPv6 NS/NA 
Auto-configuration DHCP&ICMP RS/RA ICMPv6 RS/RA & DHCPv6 
Fault isolation ICMP ICMPv6 
IPsec support Optional Recommended 
Fragmentation Both in hosts and routers Only in hosts 
1.1.1 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) 
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is part of the IP suite as 
defined in (Postel, 1981). ICMP messages are typically used for diagnostic, testing, 
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and control purposes. Alternatively, they are generated in response to errors and to 
report problem conditions in IP operations that are directed to the source IP address 
of the originating packet. 
ICMPv6 messages (RFC 2463) contain a type and a code that relates the 
details of the message to the type of message, as well as a checksum and a payload 
with variable size. ICMPv6 error messages relay useful information back to the 
source of the packet regarding any error that may have occurred along the path 
(Convery and Miller, 2004). The header format is the same for both ICMPv4 and 
ICMPv6. The general packet structure of ICMPv6 is shown in Figure 1.1.  
Header 
8- bit ICMP Type 
(0-7 bit) 
8- bit ICMP Code 
(8-15 bit) 
16- bit ICMP Checksum 
(16-31 bit) 
Protocol Payload ICMP Contents (dependent on type and code) Message Body  
(32 bit) 
Figure 1.1: General ICMPv6 Packet Structure 
Compared with IPv4, an ICMP specification for IPv6 exhibits the distinctive 
changes such as Neighbour Discovery (ND) substituting Address Resolution 
Protocol (ARP) and several administrative changes in IPv6 as following: 
 Next Header (NH) value. For ICMPv4 (1), it is changed to ICMPv6 (58). 
 ND substitutes ARP. With ICMPv6, nodes are found by ND messages similar to 
the ARP mechanism in IPv4. 
 Increased Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU). In IPv4 every node 
minimum capacity should carry at least 576 bytes, whereas in IPv6, 1500 bytes. 
 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD). ICMPv6 messages are used in IPv6 to 
replace Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP). This protocol allows 
multicast listeners to obtain desirable addresses. In IPv6, there is no longer any 
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broadcast; instead, multicast is used. Thus, ICMPv6 services ND to 
autoconfigure nodes (Frankel et al., 2010).    
1.1.2 ICMPv6 Security Considerations 
One of the main advantages of IPv6 is its auto-configuration mechanism. If 
an IPv6 enable host plugs in into an IPv6 network, its IPv6 address will be generated 
without manual configuration. This mechanism is conducted using Neighbour 
Discovery Protocol (NDP) (Narten et al., 2007).  According to Conta et al. (2006), 
NDP defines five different ICMPv6 packet types for the purpose of router 
solicitation, router advertisement, neighbour solicitation, neighbour advertisement, 
and network redirects (RFC 2461) (for more detail see Ch.2, Section 2.2.4). 
Therefore, ICMPv6 is the most important protocol associated with the IPv6 protocol, 
particularly in the auto-configuration mechanism. ICMPv6 messages have two 
categories, namely, error messages and informational messages. 
The NDP messages belong to an informational message category. However, 
the design of ICMPv6 protocol has led to be vulnerable to attacks and exploitations. 
A possible attack vector simply sends many illegal ICMPv6 messages to a network 
device (Hogg and Vyncke, 2009). A network device, such as an IPv6 host, should 
respond to each of the ICMPv6 messages received, which will increase the load of 
the node. This situation may drive CPU utilization, which causes performance 
degradation. 
Other vulnerability of ICMPv6 is it can be exploited by an attacker to carry 
out DoS and DDoS attacks. This research attempts to determine the best detection 
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method by investigating the characteristics of ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks 
in order to increase the detection accuracy.  
A significant benefit of the IPv6 protocol is expected by Internet users. Thus, 
securing IPv6 networks is highly important. In addition, the number of DoS/DDoS 
attacks is increasing every day, which can affect the ICMPv6 as follows. 
1.1.2.1 DoS/DDoS via ICMPv6 
ICMPv6 can be used to generate a DoS/DDoS attack in several ways, 
including simply sending an extreme number of ICMPv6 packets echo request type 
128 (any node can test connectivity to any other node over IPv6 by sending an Echo 
Request Message to that node, using uncast or multicast destnation) to destinations in 
the same site and sending error messages that disable established communications by 
causing sessions to drop. Moreover, if the spurious communication establishment or 
maintenance messages can be infiltrated onto a link, it could be possible to invalidate 
legitimate addresses or disable interfaces (RFC 4890). DoS/DDoS can be classified 
into two categories; applications level and network devices level, based on the 
attacked level, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
One of these categories is ICMPv6 flood. In ICMPv6 flooding attacks, an 
attacker attempts to consume the maximum available bandwidth of a network or 
nodes. Such as an attacker can simply floods the targeted victim with bogus packets 
with spoofed source addresses (Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004, Safa et al., 2008). 
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Figure 1.2: Classification of DoS/DDoS Attacks 
1.1.2.2 Probing  via ICMPv6 
A main security consideration is detecting attackers from probing the site to 
determine the topology and identify hosts that might be vulnerable to attack. 
Frequently, malformed messages can be used to provoke ICMPv6 responses from 
hosts thereby informing attackers of potential targets for future attacks 
(Padmanabhan et al., 2015). However, other ICMPv6 features, such as the 
autoconfiguration of addresses, makes probing systems for weaknesses complicated 
for a malicious attacker. These features will not stop random scanning, but they will 
make it difficult to scan specific IPv6 networks. Nevertheless, IPv6 networks can be 
scanned effectively by using ICMPv6 messages if they are poorly designed (as in the 
IPv4 model) and use dense address allocations for services and routers. 
1.1.2.3 Problems Resulting from ICMPv6 Transparency 
Due to several ICMPv6 error packets need to be passed through a firewall in 
both directions, malicious users can potentially use these messages to communicate 
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between inside and outside, bypassing administrative inspection. For instance, it may 
be possible to implement a covert conversation through the payload of ICMPv6 error 
messages or tunnel inappropriate encapsulated IP packets in ICMPv6 error messages 
(Davies and Mohacsi, 2007). This problem can be mitigated by filtering ICMPv6 
errors messages using a stateful packet filtration mechanism in order to ensure that 
the packet carried as a payload is associated with real traffic to or from the protected 
network. 
1.1.2.4 Flooding Attack via ICMPv6 
One of the most frequent types of attack in IPv4 networks is a flooding 
attack, which involves flooding a network device (e.g., a router or a host) with large 
amounts of network traffic. A targeted device cannot process such large amount of 
network traffic and becomes unavailable or out of service. A flooding attack can be 
DDoS when the targeted network device is being simultaneously flooded by network 
traffic from several nodes. Thus, this type of attack can also affect IPv6 networks 
because the basic principles of a flooding attack remain the same (Alangar and 
Swaminathan, 2013). 
DDoS flooding attacks can be launched in two forms as shown in Figure 1.3: 
direct and reflector attacks. In the former, the attacker directly sends a flood of bogus 
packets to the victim through zombie machines. In the latter, the attacker sends 
request messages to reflector machines through zombie machines, while spoofing the 
source IP address of the victim server. Thus, reflector machines send their replies to 
the given address, which causes packet flooding at that site (i.e., the victim server). 
There are three major components constituting a reflector attack; the attacker, the 
amplifying reflectors, and the victim. The attacker sends ICMPv6 echo request 
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packets with the victim’s IP address as the source address to the multicast address of 
an amplifying network as the destination address. So the packets appear to have been 
sent by the victim. Since they are sent to a multicast address of a local network, all 
the hosts, except those whose configuration has been specified not to respond to 
ICMPv6 multicast packets, in the local network will respond to each of the packets. 
Therefore, Smurf is a type of amplified DoS attack. Because of this amplifying 
effect, an individual reflector attacker can send the packets at a much lower rate 
compared to the packet rates created by ordinary DoS attackers who flood the victim 
directly. (Beitollahi and Deconinck, 2012). 
 
Figure 1.3: Architecture of Flooding DDoS Attacks: (a) Direct, (b) Reflector 
New types of extension headers in IPv6 (such as the authentication header 
fields and IPv6 router header) and new types of ICMPv6 messages (such as ICMPv6 
echo request type 128) that depend on multicast addresses in IPv6 (e.g., all routers 
must have site-specific multicast addresses) can be exploited to carry out flooding 
attacks (Ektefa et al., 2010). An attacker can frequently cause unamplified flooding 
by sending packets to its victim, either by directly addressing the victim in the 
packets or by guiding the packets along a specific path through an IPv6 routing 
header (Arkko et al., 2011). 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
IPv6 exhibits security vulnerability that slows down IPv6 deployment. The 
“Ping of Death” is a famous DoS vulnerability caused by several ICMPv6 packets 
with echo requests in IPv6 networks (TechCenter, 2013). This situation has 
motivated researchers to propose techniques that can detect unknown or new 
ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS attacks. The following are the motivations of the research. 
 According to the 2014 Cyber Security Watch Survey (McPherson et al., 2014), 
the amount of security incidence continues to extend more rapidly than the 
defences of the companies. According to this report, DoS/DDoS flooding attacks 
against IPv6 are the main cyber threats in general. Many of the existing security 
vulnerability of IPv4 are inherited by IPv6. Among all major security 
vulnerabilities is a DoS/DDoS attack, which has already extended in IPv6. Since 
the basic principles of a flooding attack remain the same (Alangar and 
Swaminathan, 2013, Arkko et al., 2011, Ektefa et al., 2010, Radhakrishnan et al., 
2007). 
 Currently, there are less security techniques available to secure IPv6 protocol as 
compared to the legacy IPv4 protocol, in terms of both features and performance 
(Gont, 2011, Gont, 2012a).  
 There are many types of extension headers in IPv6, various ICMPv6 messages 
such as echo request message, and multicast dependency in IPv6 open doors for 
flooding attacks (Shanmugaraja and Chandrasekar, 2012, Oliveira et al., 2012).  
1.3 Research Problem 
At present, online communication has become a mandatory part of the 
lifestyle of many people as Internet services develops rapidly. Security researchers 
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have paid considerable attention to secure online services and communication against 
network intrusions. One of the most difficult and critical aspects in the existing 
Intrusion detection is ICMPv6 echo request DoS/DDoS flooding attack detection, 
which is explained as follows. 
The difficulties in detecting flooding attacks using existing approaches are 
due to the fact that they use simple heuristic rules, which are configured to detect the 
common and well known attacks but unable to detect the new attacks such as 
ICMPv6 flooding attacks. In addition, the difficulties in detecting malicious packet is 
that packets transmitted during flooding-based attacks can exhaust the targeted host 
CPU resources, which can lead to the degradation of system performance. Moreover, 
the existing approaches do not consider the most important features to be used which 
selected from the dataset to detect flooding attacks. 
ICMPv6 in IPv6 networks is a mandatory protocol unlike in IPv4, in which 
ICMP messages can be blocked or dropped by a default gateway. In addition, 
ICMPv6 messages are used in Neighbour Discovery process that allows IPv6 node to 
communicate and discover neighbouring node on the same link, finds routers for 
paths to other networks (Choudhary and Sekelsky, 2010), thus, introduce new 
security threats. One of these threats is ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attack, and 
several security risks are associated with uncontrolled forwarding of ICMPv6 
messages (RFC4890) (Frankel et al., 2010), which will be discussed in detail in Ch.2. 
The problem in existing techniques for detecting ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS 
flooding attacks is that they have a high false-positive rate, which leads to a low 
accuracy caused by the following reasons: 
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 Existing IPv6 security tools, such as antivirus and firewalls, are based on 
signature-based detection. Moreover, they are unable to detect ICMPv6 
DoS/DDoS flooding attacks on targeted servers because they are designed to 
protect against signature-based attacks instead of the polymorphic network 
behaviour of the attacks launched by DoS/DDoS (Ektefa et al., 2010). 
 The existing mechanism for securing the new functionality with IPv6 such as 
Neighbour Discovery monitoring tools (NDPMon) is inefficient for detecting 
ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks because this mechanism is targeted or 
designed to only detect the vulnerability of NDP-based attacks, which is a part 
of ICMPv6 protocol (Gont, 2012b). However, in this study we address the 
problem of ICMPv6 echo request.   
 Existing techniques such as NIDS use nonsophisticated or simple rule-based 
techniques, which is not consider intelligent systems to address this problem in 
an IPv6 network environment (Lo and Marchand, 2004, Salah et al., 2012). That 
is, the difficulty in detecting novel intrusions and the increasing number of false 
alarms are the major drawbacks of the IDS (Gyanchandani et al., 2012). 
 Existing techniques for securing ICMPv6 (such as IPsec and the SeND 
mechanisms) require extra encryption, which adds overhead to the process, 
thereby generating DoS attack. Hence, the significance of the detection system, 
which attempts to detect potential attacks, is a critical issue (Choudhary and 
Sekelsky, 2010). 
In order to address the security vulnerability in ICMPv6 and also to address 
the drawbacks of existing techniques which heavily relies on signature, this thesis 
proposes an anomaly-based framework by using rule-based detection with threshold 
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mechanism and using artificial neural network technique such as Back-propgation 
algorithm (BPNN) in an IPv6 network environment in order to increase the detection 
accuracy for detecting DoS/DDoS attacks against the ICMPv6 protocol. 
1.4 Research Objectives and Goals 
With the significance of network technology and the use of IPv6 network 
protocols in our daily lives, security issues related to these employed protocols 
remain a huge concern.  
The objective of this research is to propose a framework using the BPNN 
technique, which can accurately detect the presence of ICMPv6 echo request 
DoS/DDoS flooding attacks in IPv6 networks. The following objectives intend to 
solve the problem of low accuracy in terms of ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attack 
detection: 
 To propose a mechanism that adapts feature ranking and extraction 
techniques to identify the salient features in anomaly-based detection that has 
the characteristics of ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks. 
 To propose a rule-based mechanism for detecting DoS/DDoS anomalies. 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in terms of detection 
accuracy in the IPv6 environment and to compare it with existing anomaly-
based approach for DoS/DDoS flooding attacks using real traffic dataset. 
1.5 Research Contribution  
The main contribution of this research is to propose a framework based on 
BPANNs, called the Intrusion Detection System in IPv6 Network Framework 
(v6IDSF), which is designed to detect ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks with a 
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better accuracy detection rate in the IPv6 network. The contributions of the present 
research are as follows. 
 A framework to detect ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks with better accuracy 
using the BPANN technique in the IPv6 network. 
 A feature selection mechanism to identify the features that highly contribute to 
detecting ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks based on feature ranking and 
extraction techniques. 
 A rule-based mechanism to detect DoS/DDoS anomalies. 
1.6 Research Scope and Limitation 
The scope of the proposed framework in this research is limited to detect 
ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks in network layer and in the IPv6 network 
environment as shown in Table 1.2.  
The dataset, which is used to evaluate and test anomaly-based detection, was 
generated with a real traffic dataset using a real ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding attack 
test-bed via The Hacker’s Choice (THC) toolkit in the IPv6 network environment.  
Table 1.2: Research Scope and Limitation 
Items Scope of Research 
Environment IPv6 global network 
Attack type  DoS/DDoS attack against ICMPv6 protocol (excludes other anomaly behaviour) 
ICMPv6 protocol type Echo request type 128 
DoS/DDoS target Network layer 
Detection Anomaly-based detection 
Dataset Real traffic dataset 
Evaluation Accuracy Detection 
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This research does not focus on DoS/DDoS flooding attacks in IPv4 networks 
and on other flooding attacks against Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) attack in 
IPv6 networks, such as Spoofed ICMPv6 router advertisement (RA), Spoofed 
ICMPv6 neighbour advertisement (NA). 
1.7 Research Steps 
In this research, ANN is used to support the solution to increase the detection 
accuracy of ICMPv6 echo request DoS/DDoS flooding attacks in IPv6 networks by 
utilizing the v6IDSF.  
The following methodological steps are followed to achieve the objectives of 
this research: (i) reviewing related literature and analysis, (ii) proposing a new 
framework to detect ICMPv6 echo request DoS/DDoS flooding attacks, (iii) 
designing and implementing the proposed framework, and (iv) testing and evaluating 
the result and finding. Figure 1.4 illustrates the main methodological phases of the 
research process. 
 
 Figure 1.4: Main Stages of Research Process 
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In the first phase, the research problem is recognized and thoroughly 
investigated by a critical survey of existing studies. Hence, this phase provides an 
understanding of the problem, an existing solution space, and future research scope 
to detect ICMPv6 both DoS (from single attack host) and DDoS (from multiple 
attack hosts) echo request flooding attacks. 
In the second phase, the solution for research problem is presented. The 
solution consists of several stages to detect ICMPv6 flooding attack by enhancing 
detection accuracy. The proposed framework employs the features of Back-
propagation Neural Networks (BPNNs) that was trained suing dataset with attack 
traces to detect ICMPv6 flooding attacks. 
The third phase is mainly concerned with the research design and 
implementation of the v6IDSF based on BPNN to increase detection accuracy in the 
IPv6 environment, which uses only five features to improve efficiency in terms of 
attribute construction, model training, and intrusion detection. 
In the fourth phase, the test and evaluation stage also leads to the 
achievement of the objective. The proposed framework is tested and evaluated based 
on its effectiveness in increasing detection accuracy in the IPv6 environment using a 
real traffic dataset, which is generated with a real ICMPv6-based DoS/DDoS 
flooding attack test-bed. Finally, this framework is compared with existing anomaly-
based approach such as Anomaly-based Approach for ICMPv6 Flooding Detection 
(AAIFD). 
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1.8 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is structured into six chapters as follows:  
Chapter 1 presents the objectives of this thesis. It starts by presenting an 
introduction discussion for the IPv6 and ICMPv6 security. The research motivation, 
problem statement, objectives, research steps, scope and contributions are also 
provided in this chapter.  
Chapter 2 describes a background for understanding of the work that 
follows, including overview security aspects, a description of ICMPv6 flooding 
attack features based on security aspects, literature survey of the related work in the 
domain of our research, and a look at the detection model to be used as a basis frame 
for v6IDSF. 
Chapter 3 Discusses the proposed methodology by elaborating how the 
proposed solution was designed. Also, it describes the integrated phases of the 
proposed framework and the algorithm for detecting ICMPv6 DoS/DDoS flooding. 
Chapter 4 Illustrates the design and implementation of the proposed 
framework. Moreover, it illustrates the experimental direction and the 
implementation of detection. This chapter comprises the designing principles of the 
test-bed and dataset generation.  
Chapter 5 describes the further details, evaluation of the dataset; testing and 
discussion of the proposed framework in the context of network IDS. In addition, the 
chapter elaborates the results obtained from the experiments of the detection for the 
ICMPv6 packets. Also, it evaluates the performance of the proposed framework 
comparing it with existing approach (AAIFD).   
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Chapter 6, the contributions, conclusion, recommendation and the possible 
future work for this research are presented in this chapter.  
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Figure 2.1: Literature Survey and Related Work 
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2.2 Typical Attack on IPv6 
The “Ping of Death” is a famous DoS vulnerability in an IPv6 network 
caused by a number of ICMPv6 packets with RA requests. As announced in August 
2013 via security bulletins, if an attacker sends a specially crafted ICMPv6 packet to 
a target system/server, the vulnerability may enable a denial of service (TechCenter, 
2013). 
Many changes in the specifications of the IPv6 protocol may lead 
to potential security problems. This subsection mainly focuses on explaining the 
typical attacks concerning the IPv6 protocol. 
2.2.1 Misuse of ICMPv6 and Multicast 
An IPv6 network has several significant mechanisms such as ND and PMTU 
discovery, which are dependent on several types of ICMPv6 (Conta and Gupta, 
2006). The specification of ICMPv6 allows error notification responses to be sent to 
multicast addresses if a packet is targeted. This fact can be misused by an attacker. 
An attacker can cause multiple responses in a target device by sending a suitable 
packet to multicast addresses (the spoofed source of the multicast packet). 
According to Gont and Liu (2013), a Smurf attack aims to flood the target 
machine with a large amount of traffic such that the target machine will be busy 
responding to the incoming requests. In an IPv6 network, a Smurf attack occurs 
when an attacker sends spoofed ICMPv6 echo request packets Type 128 to a 
multicast group (FF02::1), with the target machine as the source. All nodes will 
receive the packets and respond to the spoofed source IP address. The target machine 
21 
 
experiencing massive traffic will be flooded if the number of nodes on the network 
that receive and respond to these packets is large. This scenario can slow down the 
target computer to a point where it becomes impossible to work with. 
Chakraborty et al. (2014), have proposed intrusion prevention system (IPS) to 
handle ICMPv6 threats in Smart Grid as a proper IPS for ICMPv6 misuse. This 
mechanism helps to efficiently prevent some attacks on the ICMPv6 protocol, such 
as DoS/DDoS attacks, man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks, and spoofing attacks. 
This mechanism is also light weight and does not load the system with redundant 
packet overhead, but it is unable to detect collaborative attacks on smart grid. 
2.2.2 Reconnaissance Attacks 
The first stage of the bigger attack is usually a reconnaissance attack. An 
intruder uses reconnaissance attacks to collect some critical data about the victim 
network that can be misused later in further attacks. An intruder can use active 
methods, such as diﬀerent scanning techniques, or passive data mining in carrying 
out reconnaissance attack (Žagar et al., 2007).  
Reconnaissance attack techniques are common for both IPv4 and IPv6. Given 
that they are both network layer protocols, many of their network layer 
vulnerabilities are similar. However, the subnet size within the IPv6 network is larger 
than that within the IPv4 network (the default size is 64 bits (RFC 5157)). To 
perform a full scan of the subnet, 264 probes should be made, thus making this task 
impossible. Unfortunately, several types of multicast addresses are used in IPv6. This 
structure helps an intruder to easily identify hosts in an IPv6 network. RFC 2375 and 
Hinden and Deering (1998) proposed a node, a link, and a site-specific use of 
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multicast addresses (e.g., all routers have a site-specific address FF02::2), which 
defines the initial assignment of IPv6 multicast addresses. 
2.2.3 Fragmentation-Related Attacks 
According to Conta and Gupta (2006), IPv6 protocol specification does not 
allow packet fragmentation by intermediary devices. The minimum MTU size 
recommended for ICMPv6 is 1280 octets. As a good security practice, fragments 
with less than 1280 octets should be dropped. By using fragmentation, an intruder 
can obtain port numbers that are not found in the first fragment, thus avoiding 
security monitoring devices that expect to find transport layer protocol data in the 
first fragment.  
According to Hyuk et al. (2009), an attacker can cause a flood of 
reconstruction buffers in a target machine to initiate a system crash by sending a 
huge number of small fragments (a type of DoS attack).  
2.2.4 IPv6 Neighbour Discovery Flooding Attack 
NDP messages are part of ICMPv6, which provides functionalities for 
reporting error messages, performing network diagnostics, and handling multicast 
memberships (Lee and Stolfo, 2000).  
NDP operates in the link layer of the Internet model (RFC 1122), and is 
responsible for the address auto-configuration of nodes, discovery of other nodes on 
the link, determining the link-layer addresses of other nodes, duplicate address 
detection (DAD), detecting available routers and Domain Name System (DNS) 
servers, address prefix discovery, and maintaining reachability information about the 
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paths to other active neighbour nodes (RFC 4861) (Barbhuiya et al., 2013, Conta and 
Gupta, 2006). 
 NDP defines five ICMPv6 packet types for the purpose of router solicitation 
(RS), Router Advertisement (RA), Neighbour Solicitation (NS), Neighbour 
Advertisement (NA), and network redirects (Barbhuiya et al., 2011). Table 2.1 shows 
the ICMPv6 messages defined for NDP. 
Table 2.1: ICMPv6 Messages Defined for NDP 
ICMPv6 packet type Description 
RS (Type 133) 
Hosts inquire with RS messages to locate routers on an 
attached link. Nodes that forward packets not addressed to 
them generate RAs immediately upon receipt of this 
message, rather than at their next scheduled time. 
RA (Type 134) 
Routers advertise their presence together with various link 
and Internet parameters, either periodically or in response to 
an RS message. 
NS (Type 135) 
NSs are used by nodes to determine the link layer address of 
neighbour or verify that a neighbour is still reachable via 
cached link layer address. 
NA (Type 136 NAs are used by nodes to respond to an NS message. 
Redirect (Type 137) 
Routers may inform hosts of a better first hop router for a 
destination. 
By default, all IPv6 addresses are automatically part of the multicast address 
group FF02::1 and other groups (Figure 2.2). The MAC address look-up of the target 
host in an IPv6 network can be performed by sending an ICMPv6 packet to the 
multicast address FF02::1. The sent packet will reach all active link-local addresses 
on the network (RFC 3513). Exchanging ICMPv6 messages on the top of the IPv6 
protocol is crucial for IPv6 communication. However, this communication can be 
abused by sending fake, carefully crafted response messages for DoS/DDoS attack, 
traffic re-routing, or other malicious purposes. 
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Figure 2.2: Joined Multicast Groups for IPv6 Address 
2.2.5 DDoS Flooding Attacks on IPv6 
A DoS/DDoS attack is one of the most significant threats in IPv4 and IPv6 
networks. These attacks consume the network bandwidth and computational 
resources of the target and that of other users on the same network. A DoS/DDoS 
attack, generated by utilizing the vulnerabilities in a network protocol, affects the 
performance of the target and the other hosts sharing the network (Meenakshi and 
Srivatsa, 2007). A target device is unable to process the large amount of network 
traffic caused by these attacks and becomes unavailable or out of service. 
 Figure 2.3 illustrates the steps of a typical DDoS attack. First, an attacker 
selects more than one handler which has security vulnerabilities, and intrudes them 
by gaining access right. And the procedures for selecting agents are performed as the 
same way for selecting handlers, but the attacker indirectly achieves it through 
handlers. Second, the agents will perform DDoS attack actually by sending huge 
amounts of malicious traffic to a target system simultaneously. The handlers and 
agents are usually located in the external networks of victim’s and attacker’s 
network. Commonly, ICMPv6 is used for preform scanning to find hosts which have 
security vulnerabilities (There are several events that take place during the 
